Monthly Factsheet

AVI GLOBAL TRUST PLC

Monthly Update

AVI Global Trust plc (the "Company") presents its Update, reporting performance figures for the month ended 30 November 2025.

This Monthly Newsletter is available on the Company's website at: AGT-NOVEMBER-2025.pdf

This investment management report relates to performance figures to 30 November 2025.

All performance shown net of fees in GBP Total Return as at 30/11/2025.

1Net Asset Value cum-fair.

2From 1st October 2023, the comparator benchmark was changed to the MSCI ACWI Index. Prior to this, from 1st October 2013, the comparator benchmark was the MSCI ACWI ex US Index.

Source: Morningstar, S&P Capital IQ

Manager's Comment

AVI Global Trust's (AGT) NAV declined -0.6% in November 2025.

Jardine Matheson was the top contributor adding +40bps to returns. Other strong contributors were Tokyo Gas and Youngone Corp (both +31bps) . We expand upon Youngone Corp - and its parent Youngone Holdings - below.

Vivendi was the standout detractor shaving off -154bps. Chrysalis, D'Ieteren and News Corp also detracted.

Vivendi

Shares in Vivendi fell -20% over the month, as weak NAV performance (-6%) was compounded by a significant widening of the discount from 38% to 46% (a return of -14%).

In the July 2025 newsletter we provided an update on the investment in Vivendi. At the time we explained how - subject to a court appeal process - the AMF had declared that Vincent Bollore was obligated to make a mandatory offer for Vivendi. This followed a ruling by a Parisian court that he was deemed to be in de-facto control of Vivendi at the time of the December 2024 split-up transaction.

During the month the Cour de Cassation ruled in favour of Bollore's appeal, arguing against the notion of de-facto control and asking the lower court judges to re-examine the case. In turn the AMF has suspended its ruling of a mandatory takeover offer on Vivendi whilst this process continues. We now face a wrought and long-winded legal process with an uncertain outcome and potential further appeals to appeals.

Net-net, however, the odds of a near-term mandatory takeover offer are meaningfully lower than a few weeks ago, and this has been reflected in a widening of Vivendi's discount, which now stands close to 50%. We believe this to be astounding value - wider than Vivendi's historic discount when it was a more complex beast, and out of whack with other European holding company discounts today - but wholly concede that there are limited catalysts for this to narrow in the near-term.

Indeed, this serves as a great and painful reminder of the often-ethereal nature of events/catalysts - which have a habit of not occurring or taking longer to occur than many expect. In such scenarios, the NAV side of the equation is imperative to one's return.

And in this vein, we believe there is a lot to be excited about. UMG shares have underperformed significantly, having fallen -21% since late July (whilst the MSCI ACWI is up +10%). We believe a large portion of this weakness is attributable to more technical factors. More specifically there has been a multi-pronged overhang deterring new buyers in the form of: 1) an overhang from Bollore who was perceived to be a potential seller of UMG stock in the event of a mandatory takeover offer; 2) pressure from event driven investors who were long Vivendi and short UMG; 3) a continued overhang on account of the delayed US listing.

This has pushed UMG to a record low valuation - with the shares trading at <18x 2026 PE excluding the stake in Spotify. This de-rating stands in stark contrast to the fundamentals, which are improving. Streaming growth has been impressive in 2025 without any meaningful contribution from DSP price raises. As we look into 2026, with the benefit of streaming 2.0 deals and faster growth, there is a strong case that the market will start to reward this with a higher multiple, reflective of the company's unique asset base and its potential to sustain growth over the long-term underpinned by the re-monetisation of music.

All told, Vivendi remains one of the highest potential upside positions in the portfolio, with strong NAV growth prospects and a very wide discount. We added to the position over the month.

Youngone Group

In previous newsletters, we have talked at length about the developing opportunity set in Korea, which now accounts for 11% of NAV. Whilst there is a thematic overlay to our investments in Korea, each individual position stands on its own two feet, with "typical" AVI traits. In this month's newsletter, we intend to bring this out.

The Youngone Group are two of AGT's South Korean positions, initiated in June 2025, with a joint position size of c. 2%. For liquidity purposes, we split the position across Youngone Holdings (1.1% of NAV) and Youngone Corp (0.9% of NAV).

We believe the group exhibits many of the qualities that we look for in our portfolio companies. Youngone Holdings' NAV is predominantly comprised of its 53% stake in Youngone Corp, which accounts for c. 102% of market cap, as well as positions in Youngone Outdoor, which owns the rights to the North Face brand in South Korea, a 4% stake in Japan-listed Goldwin, and a small net cash position.

In turn, Youngone Corp's operations are also heavily undervalued, as explained below, and the company boasts a net cash position worth 34% of market cap. Both companies trade at wide discounts to their sum of the parts (Youngone Holdings -46% and Youngone Corporation -64%).

For this month's newsletter, we wanted to discuss our investment in Youngone Corporation ("Youngone") and its OEM operations.

Youngone is a leading global manufacturer of premium technical outerwear, acting as the strategic OEM partner to over 40 global apparel brands, such as The North Face, Arc'teryx, Lululemon, and Patagonia.

Founded in 1974 by Ki-hak Sung as an export and sales company for apparel in Korea, Youngone has evolved into a sophisticated manufacturer of high-performance outerwear through five decades of accumulated expertise and manufacturing scale. High-value performance apparel, which represents c. 85% of Youngone's OEM sales, is a structurally less competitive and less commoditised segment than general apparel OEM, given the complexity of producing advanced garments at global scale and the long development cycles required (3-4-month lead times). Youngone's major customers view the company as an extension of their own supply chain rather than an outsourced, replaceable vendor.

Youngone was the first garment manufacturer to enter Bangladesh in 1980, today controlling over c. 1,000 acres of manufacturing space. The company employ both skilled local workers, who have had internal training for 30+ years at Youngone, and a locally experienced management team. This well-established, large manufacturing base is a strong barrier to entry for competitors and provides a cost-competitive foothold for Youngone's manufacturing operations.

This combination of cost advantages and high client switching costs has compounded Youngone's consolidated earnings at a CAGR of +12% since 2008 and delivered strong returns on capital over the same period.

Despite the quality of Youngone's OEM operations, the company continues to trade at an undemanding valuation that fails to reflect the quality of its underlying business, trading at just 1.0x P/B and 5.6x EV/fwd. EBIT. For comparison, close listed peers Eclat Textile and Makalot Industrial, trade at an average 5.0x PB and 14.8x EBIT. Youngone has traded at an average discount of -65% to these peers since 2017.

We believe this perpetual discount is the result of the company's lack of a capital allocation framework, holding a net cash position worth 34% of market cap, poor quality IR materials with zero English disclosure, limited investor access to the company, and zero international broker coverage.

Crucially, all of these issues are governance-and communicationrelated and could be directly resolved with better capital discipline and shareholder alignment. As with many first-generation, founder-led Korean companies, Youngone has deprioritised capital returns and transparency, in favour of preserving control and minimising tax friction ahead of succession. But with corporate governance reform a core focus of the new DPK government, the cost of inaction will rise as peer behaviour starts to evolve. For Youngone, even modest improvements on any of these fronts could result in a material re-rating, given the scale of the valuation gap and large net cash pile.

While we wait for these structural changes to play out, the investment case remains underpinned by the durable, high-return OEM business, which should continue to compound earnings at a high-single-digit to low-teens rate, on rising volumes from key clients, such as Arc'teryx.

To date, Youngone Holding and Corp have delivered returns of +29% and +45%, which translate to IRRs in the triple digits. We remain optimistic about prospective returns.

Contributors / Detractors (in GBP)4

3All Figures shown as % of Net Asset Value

4Contributors and detractors from Factset

MUFG Corporate Governance Limited

Corporate Secretary

12 December 2025

LEI: 213800QUODCLWWRVI968

The content of the Company's web-pages and the content of any website or pages which may be accessed through hyperlinks on the Company's web-pages, other than the content of the Newsletter referred to above, is neither incorporated into nor forms part of the above announcement.